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c TÜBİTAK
Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci, Vol.19, No.3, 2011, 
doi:10.3906/elk-1004-16

Remote mutual authentication and key agreement
scheme based on elliptic curve cryptosystem
Eun-Jun YOON
School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Kyungpook National University,
1370 Sankyuk-Dong, Buk-Gu, Daegu 702-701, SOUTH KOREA
e-mail: ejyoon@knu.ac.kr

Received: 07.04.2010

Abstract
Remote mutual authentication is an important part of security, along with conﬁdentiality and integrity,
for systems that allow remote access over untrustworthy networks, like the Internet. In 2006, Shieh-Wang
pointed out the weakness of Juang’s remote mutual authentication scheme using smart card and further
proposed a novel remote user authentication scheme using smart card. However, this paper demonstrates
that Shieh-Wang’s scheme still does not provide perfect forward secrecy and is vulnerable to a privileged
insider’s attack. We also present an improved scheme based on the Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman problem
(ECDHP) and secure one-way hash function, in order to isolate such security problems.
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1.

Introduction

Remote mutual authentication is a mechanism for two communicating parties to mutually authenticate each
other through an insecure communication channel. In addition, a smart card based remote mutual authentication scheme is very practical to authenticate remote users [1, 2]. Since Lamport [3] proposed a remote
authentication scheme in 1981, many researchers have proposed new schemes to improve the eﬃciency and
security [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
In 2000, Sun [4] proposed a cost eﬀective unilateral remote authentication scheme in which only a
server can authenticate a user’s legitimacy. In 2002, Chien-Jan-Tseng [5] proposed an eﬃcient remote mutual
authentication scheme using smart card allowing server and user to authenticate each other. The advantages in
the scheme include freely chosen passwords, no veriﬁcation tables, low communication and computation costs.
However, as demonstrated by Hsu [6], Chien-Jan-Tseng’s scheme is vulnerable to the parallel session attack.
Thereafter, in 2004, Juang [7] proposed another improved scheme preserving all the advantages of Chien-JanTseng’s scheme. Unlike Chien-Jan-Tseng’s scheme, Juang’s scheme is a nonce based authentication and key
agreement scheme. Therefore, no synchronized clocks are required in the scheme. In addition, Juang’s scheme
generates a session key for the user and server in their subsequent communication.
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Recently, Shieh-Wang [8], however, pointed out another weakness of Juang’s scheme and then proposed an
improvement of the scheme to improve the weakness. Shieh-Wang claimed that their scheme not only preserves
all the advantages of Juang’s scheme but also improves its eﬃciency.
Nevertheless, this paper demonstrates that Shieh-Wang’s scheme still does not provide perfect forward
secrecy [14] and is vulnerable to a privileged insider’s attack [15, 16]. We also present an improved scheme based
on Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman problem (ECDHP) and secure one-way hash function, in order to isolate such
security problems. The Elliptic Curve cryptosystems [17, 18], which are based on the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) over a ﬁnite ﬁeld, have some advantages over other cryptosystems: The key
size can be much smaller than those of the other cryptosystems since only exponential-time attacks have been
known to occur so far, if the curve is carefully chosen [19], and that the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms might
still be intractable even if factoring and the multiplicative group discrete logarithm turn out to be tractable
problems. As a result, the improved scheme has the following merits: (1) The scheme provides not only perfect
forward secrecy but also explicit mutual authentication between the user and a remote server. (2) The scheme
does not require time synchronization or a delay-time limitations by using timestamp between the user and
the remote system. (3) In order to prevent the problems of clock synchronization or a delay-time limitations,
the proposed scheme adopts a nonce-based scheme [20] instead of a timestamp-based scheme. (4) The security
of the proposed scheme is based on Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman problem (ECDHP) [21] and one-way hash
function to suitable for light-weight authentication and key agreement. (5) The scheme resists the privileged
insider’s attack. (6) The scheme provides secure password change scheme without helping of the remote server.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows¿ Section 2 brieﬂy reviews Shieh-Wang’s scheme.
Section 3 demonstrates the security weaknesses of Shieh-Wang’s scheme. The proposed authentication scheme
is presented in Section 4, while Sections 5 and 6 discusses the security and performance of the proposed scheme,
respectively. The conclusion is given in Section 7.

2.

Review of Shieh-Wang’s scheme

This section brieﬂy reviews Shieh-Wang’s a remote mutual authentication and key agreement scheme using
smart card with secure one-way hash function [8]. Some of the notations used in this paper are deﬁned as
follows.
• Ui : user i
• ID i : identity of Ui
• P Wi : password of Ui
• x : the secret key maintained by the server
• h(·): a secure one-way hash function
• ⊕: exclusive-or operation
• || : string concatenation operation
• q : the order of the underlying ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq
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• E : a suitably chosen Elliptic Curve deﬁned over Fq
• P : a base point in the generator point E
• n: the prime order of P
• O : the point at inﬁnity, where nP = O and P = O .
Figure 1 shows Shieh-Wang’s scheme and the scheme consists of two phases: the registration, and the
login and key agreement.
Shared Information: h(·).
Information held by User Ui : IDi , P Wi , Smart card(IDi , Ri , h(·)).
Information held by Remote Server: x.
User Ui

Remote Server

Registration Phase:
Select IDi , P Wi

IDi , P Wi
−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
→

Smart Card
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(Secure Channel)
Login and Key Agreement Phase:
Input IDi ,P Wi
a i ← Ri ⊕ P W i
Pick up Tu
M ACu ← h(Tu ||ai )
(IDi , Tu , M ACu )
−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
→

Ri ← h(IDi ⊕ x) ⊕ P Wi
Store Ri , h(·) in Smart Card

Check Tu
ai ← h(IDi ⊕ x)
 ← h(T ||a )
M ACu
u
i
?

Check Tu
M ACs ← h(Tu ||Ts ||ai )

(Tu , Ts , M ACs )
←
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−

 = M AC
Check M ACu
u
Pick up Ts
M ACs ← h(Tu ||Ts ||ai )
Ks ← h((Tu ||Ts ) ⊕ ai )

?

Check M ACs = M ACs

M ACu
← h(Ts ||(ai + 1))
Ks ← h((Tu ||Ts ) ⊕ ai )


(Ts , M ACu
)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→


M ACu
← h(Ts ||(ai + 1))
?

 = M AC 
Check M ACu
u

Shared session key Ku = Ks = h((Tu ||Ts ) ⊕ ai )

Figure 1. Shieh-Wang’s remote mutual authentication and key agreement scheme.

2.1.

Registration phase

Assume a user Ui submits his/her identity ID i and password P Wi to the server over a secure channel for
registration. If the request is accepted, the server computes Ri = h(ID i ⊕ x) ⊕ P Wi and issues Ui a smart card
containing Ri and h(·).

2.2.

Login and key agreement phase

When the user Ui wants to login to the server, he/she ﬁrst inserts his/her smart card into a card reader then
inputs his/her identity ID i and password P Wi . The smart card then performs the following steps to begin an
access session:
1. Compute ai = Ri ⊕ P Wi .
2. Acquire current time stamp Tu , store Tu temporarily until the end of the session, and compute M ACu =
h(Tu ||ai ).
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3. Send the message (ID i , Tu , M ACu) to the server and wait for response from the server. If no response is
received in time or the response is incorrect, report login failure to the user and stop the session.
After receiving the message (ID i , Tu , M ACu) from Ui , the server performs the following steps to assure
the integrity of the message, respond to Ui , and challenge Ui to avoid replay:
1. Check the freshness of Tu . If Tu has already appeared in a current executing session of user Ui , reject
Ui ’s login request and stop the session. Otherwise, Tu is fresh.
2. Compute ai = h(ID i ⊕x), M ACu = h(Tu ||ai ), and check whether M ACu is equal to the received M ACu .
If it is not, reject Ui ’s login and stop the session.
3. Acquire the current time stamp Ts . Store temporarily paired time stamps (Tu , Ts ) and ID i for freshness
checking until the end of the session. Compute M ACs = h(Tu ||Ts ||ai ) and session key Ks = h((Tu ||Ts ) ⊕
ai ). Then, send the message (Tu , Ts , M ACs ) back to Ui and wait for response from Ui . If no response
is received in time or the response is incorrect, reject Ui ’s login and stop the session.
On receiving the message (Tu , Ts , M ACs ) from the server, the smart card performs the following steps
to authenticate the server, achieve session key agreement, and respond to the server:
1. Check if the received Tu is equal to the stored Tu to assure the freshness of the received message. If it is
not, report login failure to the user and stop the session.
2. Compute M ACs = h(Tu ||Ts ||ai ) and check whether it is equal to the received M ACs . If not, report login
failure to the user and stop. Otherwise, conclude that the responding party is the real server.
3. Compute M ACu = h(Ts ||(ai + 1)) and session key Ks = h((Tu ||Ts ) ⊕ ai ), then send the message
(Ts , M ACu ) back to the server. Note that, in the message (Ts , M ACu), Ts is a response to the server.
When the message (Ts , M ACu ) from Ui is received, the server performs the following steps to authenticate Ui and achieve key agreement:
1. Check if the received Ts is equal to the stored Ts . If it fails, reject Ui ’s login request and stop the session.
2. Compute M ACu = h(Ts ||(ai + 1)) and check whether it is equal to M ACu . If it is not, reject Ui ’s
login request and stop the session. Otherwise, conclude that Ui is a legal user and permit the user Ui ’s
login. At this moment, mutual authentication and session key agreement between Ui and the server are
achieved. From now on, the user Ui and the server can use the session key Ks in their further secure
communication until the end of the access session.

3.

Weaknesses of Shieh-Wang’s scheme

This section shows that Shieh-Wang’s remote mutual authentication and key agreement scheme does not provide
perfect forward secrecy [14] and is vulnerable to a privileged insider attack [15, 16]. In addition, the scheme has
a time synchronization problem [7].
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3.1.

Perfect forward secrecy problem

Perfect forward secrecy [14] is a very important security requirement for evaluating a strong protocol. A protocol
with perfect forward secrecy assures that even if one entity’s long-term key (e.g. user password or server’s secret
key) is compromised, it will never reveal any old fresh session keys used before. For example, the well-known
Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement scheme can provide perfect forward secrecy.
However, Shieh-Wang’s scheme does not provide it because once the secret key x of the server is disclosed,
all previous fresh session keys Ks will also be opened and hence previous communication messages will be
learned. In the Shieh-Wang’s scheme, suppose an attacker E obtains the secret key x from the compromised
server and intercepts transmitted values (ID i , Tu , Ts ), from an open network. It is easy to obtain the
information since its are exposed over an open network. Then, E can easily compute ai = h(ID i ⊕ x) by using
the obtained ID i . Finally, E can compute the shared session key Ks = h((Tu ||Ts ) ⊕ ai ) by using ai , Tu and
Ts . By using the Ks , E can eavesdrop all previous communication messages. Obviously, Shieh-Wang’s scheme
does not provide perfect forward secrecy.

3.2.

Privileged insider’s attack

In practice, a user uses the same password to access several servers for his/her convenience. In the registration
phase of Shieh-Wang’s scheme, Ui ’s password P Wi will be revealed to the remote server because it is transmitted
directly to the server. Then, the privileged insider of the remote server may try to use P Wi to impersonate Ui
to login the other servers that Ui has registered with outside this system [15]. If the targeted outside server
adopts the normal password authentication scheme, it is possible that the privileged insider of the server can
successfully impersonate Ui to login it by using P Wi . Although, it is also possible that all the privileged insiders
of the server are trusted and Ui does not use the same password to access several servers, the implementers
and the users of the scheme should be aware of such a potential weakness. Obviously, Shieh-Wang’s scheme is
vulnerable to a privileged insider attack.

3.3.

Time synchronization problem

The schemes based on timestamps must overcome the problems of clock synchronization and delay-time limitation so that we better implement them in fast local area networks. Because Shieh-Wang’s scheme also used
timestamps to resist replay attacks, the scheme can lead to serious clock synchronization problems, namely
that the user’s time and the server’s time must diﬀer only in a small range [7]. For example, in a large-scale
network, it is almost impossible to maintain the synchronization of clocks among all entities in the network and
to guarantee the delay time of transmission. Therefore, we proposed a nonce-based and simpliﬁed scheme to
avoid these clock synchronization and delay-time limitation problems.

4.

Proposed scheme

This section proposes an improvement of Shieh-Wang’s scheme so that they can withstand the above mentioned
problems. The proposed scheme consists of three phases: the registration, the login and key agreement, and
the password change. Figure 2 shows the proposed remote mutual authentication and key agreement scheme.
It works as follows.
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Shared Information: h(·), Elliptic Curve parameters(E, P, Fq ).
Information held by User Ui : IDi , P Wi , Smart card(IDi , Vi , Ri , h(·)).
Information held by Remote Server: x.
User Ui

Remote Server

Registration Phase:
Select IDi , P Wi , Ni

IDi , h(P Wi ||Ni )
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→

Input Ni in Smart Card

Smart Card
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(Secure Channel)
Login and Key Agreement Phase:
Input IDi ,P Wi
ai ← Ri ⊕ h(P Wi ||Ni )
Vi ← h(ai ||h(P Wi ||Ni ))

Vi ← h(h(IDi ||x)||h(P Wi ||Ni ))
Ri ← h(IDi ||x) ⊕ h(P Wi ||Ni )
Store Vi , Ri , h(·) in Smart Card

?

Check Vi = Vi
Choose random α ∈ [2, n − 2]
M ACu ← h(IDi ||αP ||ai )

(IDi , αP, M ACu )
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→

Check IDi
ai ← h(IDi ||x)
 ← h(ID ||αP ||a )
M ACu
i
i
?

SKu ← αβP

(βP, M ACs )
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
M ACs ← h(IDi ||SKu ||αP ||ai )
?
Check M ACs = M ACs


M ACu
← h(SKu ||βP ||ai )
(M ACu
)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→

 = M AC
Check M ACu
u
Choose random β ∈ [2, n − 2]
SKs ← αβP
M ACs ← h(IDi ||SKs ||αP ||ai )


M ACu
← h(SKs ||βP ||ai )
 =

Check M ACu
M ACu
?

Shared session key SKu = SKs = αβP

Figure 2. Proposed remote mutual authentication and key agreement scheme.

4.1.

Registration phase

When a new user Ui wants to registration, the proposed registration phase performs the following steps:
1. Ui freely chooses his/her identity ID i , password P Wi and a random number Ni . Then, Ui computes
h(P Wi ||Ni ) and submits it with ID i to the remote server for registration. These private data must be
sent in person or over a secure channel.
2. If the request is accepted, the server computes Vi = h(h(ID i ||x)||h(P Wi||Ni )) and Ri = h(ID i ||x) ⊕
h(P Wi ||Ni ), and issues Ui a smart card containing Vi , Ri and h(·).
3. After receiving the smart card, Ui enters Ni into his/her smart card.

4.2.

Login and key agreement phase

When the user Ui wants to login to the server, he/she ﬁrst inserts his/her smart card into a card reader then
inputs his/her identity ID i and password P Wi . The smart card then performs the following steps to begin an
access session:
1. Compute ai = Ri ⊕ h(P Wi ||Ni ).
2. Compute Vi = h(ai ||h(P Wi||Ni )) and check whether it is equal to the stored Vi . If not, report password
P Wi is incorrect to the user. This veriﬁcation process performs only three times that can withstand
password guessing attack by using the stolen or lost smart card.
3. Choose a random number α ∈ [2, n − 2] , and compute αP and M ACu = h(ID i ||αP ||ai).
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4. Send the message (ID i , αP, M ACu) to the server.
After receiving the message (ID i , αP, M ACu) from Ui , the server performs the following steps to assure
the integrity of the message, respond to Ui , and challenge Ui to avoid replay:
1. Check the correctness of ID i . If it is incorrect, reject Ui ’s login request and stop the session.
2. Compute ai = h(ID i ||x), M ACu = h(ID i ||αP ||ai), and check whether M ACu is equal to the received
M ACu . If it is not, reject Ui ’s login and stop the session.
3. Choose a random number β ∈ [2, n − 2] , compute βP , session key SKs = αβP and M ACs =
h(ID i ||SKs ||αP ||ai). Then, send the message (βP, M ACs ) back to Ui and wait for response from Ui .
On receiving the message (βP, M ACs ) from the server, the smart card of Ui performs the following steps
to authenticate the server, achieve session key agreement, and respond to the server:
1. Compute session key SKu = αβP and M ACs = h(ID i ||SKu ||αP ||ai), and check whether it is equal
to the received M ACs . If not, report login failure to the user and stop. Otherwise, conclude that the
responding party is the real server.
2. Compute M ACu = h(SKu ||βP ||ai) and send the message (M ACu ) back to the server. Note that, in the
message (M ACu ) is a response to the server.
When the message (M ACu ) from Ui is received, the server performs the following steps to authenticate
Ui and achieve key agreement:
1. Compute M ACu = h(SKs ||βP ||ai).
2. Check whether M ACu is equal to M ACu . If it is not, reject Ui ’s login request and stop the session.
Otherwise, conclude that Ui is a legal user and permit the user Ui ’s login. At this moment, mutual
authentication and session key agreement between Ui and the server are achieved. From now on, the user
Ui and the server can use the session key SKu = SKs = αβP in their further secure communication until
the end of the access session.

4.3.

Password change scheme

The password change scheme is invoked whenever a user Ui wants to change his password P Wi . By invoking
this scheme, Ui can easily change his password without taking any assistance from the remote server. Figure 3
shows the proposed password change scheme and it works as follows.
1. Ui inserts his/her smart card into a card reader then inputs his/her identity ID i and password P Wi .
2. The smart card computes ai = Ri ⊕ h(P Wi ||Ni ).
3. The smart card computes hash value Vi = h(ai ||h(P Wi ||Ni )) and veriﬁes it with stored Vi . If it holds,
the smart card proceeds to the next step; otherwise, terminates the operation. This veriﬁcation process
performs only three times that can withstand password guessing attack by using stolen or lost smart card.
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User Ui
(IDi , P Wi )
Input old password P Wi
Choose new P Wi∗

Smart Card
(IDi , Vi , Ri , Ni )

Password update request, P Wi , P Wi∗
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→

ai = Ri ⊕ h(P Wi ||Ni )

Vi = h(ai ||h(P Wi ||Ni ))
?

Verify Vi = Vi
Vi∗ = h(ai ||h(P Wi∗ ||Ni ))
∗
R∗
i = ai ⊕ h(P Wi ||N )
Update Vi and Ri with Vi∗ and R∗
i
Password update reply
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

Figure 3. Password change scheme.

4. Ui submits a new password P Wi∗ .
5. The smart card computes Vi∗ = h(ai ||h(P Wi∗||Ni )) and R∗i = ai ⊕ h(P Wi∗ ||N ).
6. The password has been changed now with the new password P Wi∗ and the smart card replaced the
previously stored Vi and Ri values by Vi∗ and R∗i values.

5.

Security analysis

This section analyzes the security of the proposed remote mutual authentication and key agreement scheme.
First, we deﬁne the security terms [14, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25] needed to conduct an analysis of the proposed scheme.
They are as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A weak secret key (user’s password P Wi ) is the value of low entropy W (k), which can be guessed
in polynomial time.
Deﬁnition 2 A strong secret key (server’s secret key x ) is the value of high entropy S(k), which cannot be
guessed in polynomial time.
Deﬁnition 3 The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP ) is as follows: given a public key point
V = αP , it is hard to compute the secret key α .
Deﬁnition 4 The Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (ECDHP ) is as follows: given point elements αP
and βP , it is hard to ﬁnd αβP .
Deﬁnition 5 A secure one-way hash function y = h(x) is one where given x to compute y is easy, and given
y to compute x is hard.
The following eight security properties [14, 22, 24] must be considered for the proposed protocol: a replay attack,a
guessing attack, a reﬂection and parallel session attack, a privileged insider attack, a mutual authentication, a
perfect forward secrecy, a fast wrong password detection and a secure password change. Regarding the above
mentioned deﬁnitions, the followings are used to analyze the eight security properties of the proposed scheme.
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1. The proposed scheme can resist a replay attack: When the server receives the message (ID i , αP, M ACu ),
it includes a fresh Diﬃe-Hellman element αP from Ui . Therefore, the server must send back the received
T to Ui including M ACs as a response. When Ui receives the message (βP, M ACs ), it includes the
fresh Diﬃe-Hellman element αP in the M ACs . Note that αP is fresh on each session. Besides, M ACu
and M ACs guarantee their integrity and source, respectively. In addition, it is impossible to create
corresponding responses and their message authentication codes, M ACs and M ACu , without knowing
the shared secret value ai between Ui and the server. Therefore, except for Ui and the server, no one
can pass the challenges.
2. The proposed scheme can resist a guessing attack: Assume a user lost his/her smart card and it is found
by an attacker or an attacker steals a user’s smart card. The attacker, however, cannot impersonate a
legitimate user Ui by using the smart card because no one can reveal the P Wi from value Ri in the smart
card without knowing the system’s secret key x . Furthermore, the server’s secret key x is protected by the
secure one-way hash function h(·). It is computationally infeasible to derive x from the value h(ID i ||x).
In the same way, the shared secret ai between Ui and the server cannot be derived from the message
authentication code M ACu , M ACs , or M ACu . Therefore, ai is safely shared only between Ui and the
server.
3. The proposed scheme can resist a reﬂection attack and a parallel session attack [6]: In the proposed
scheme, the reﬂection attack and a parallel session attack will fail because of the asymmetric structure
of the message authentication codes M ACu and M ACu . Note that M ACu ← h(T ||αP ||ai) and
M ACu ← h(SKu ||βP ||ai). Therefore, the proposed scheme can resist a reﬂection attack and a parallel
session attack.
4. The proposed scheme can resist a privileged insider attack: Since Ui registers to the server by presenting
h(P Wi ||Ni ) instead of P Wi , the insider of the server cannot directly obtain P Wi without knowing of
random nonce Ni . Therefore, the proposed scheme can withstand the insider attack.
5. The proposed scheme provides the mutual authentication: Mutual authentication between Ui and the
server is achieved, because Ui and the server authenticate each other with the message authentication
codes M ACs , and M ACu , respectively. Since nobody can create the correct message authentication
codes without knowing the shared secret value ai between Ui and the server, ai is used to conﬁrm the
legitimacy of each party. In other words, it is infeasible for an intruder or a pretended server to masquerade
as a legal party. Also, the proposed scheme uses the Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange algorithm
in order to provide mutual explicit key authentication. Then, the key is explicitly authenticated by a
mutual conﬁrmation session key, SK = αβP .
6. The proposed scheme provides a perfect forward secrecy: In the proposed scheme, since the Elliptic Curve
Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange algorithm is used to generate a session key SK = αβP , perfect forward
secrecy is ensured because an attacker with a compromised server’s secret key x is only able to obtain
the αP and βP from an earlier session. In addition, it is also computationally infeasible to obtain the
session key αβP from αP and βP , as it is a ECDLP and a ECDHP.
7. The proposed scheme provides a fast wrong password detection: In Shieh-Wang’s scheme, if user Ui input
a wrong password P Wi by mistake, this wrong password will be detected by the remote server in the login
and key agreement phase. Therefore, Shieh-Wang’s scheme is slow to detect the user’s wrong password.
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In contrast to Shieh-Wang’s scheme, in the proposed scheme, if user Ui inputs the wrong password by
mistake, this wrong password will be quickly detected by a smart card since the smart card can verify
Vi = Vi using the stored Ki in step 2 of the login and key agreement phase. Therefore, the proposed
scheme provides fast wrong password detection.
8. The proposed scheme provides a secure password change: Shieh-Wang’s scheme does not provide password
change scheme. The proposed password change scheme is simple and secure. Because the smart card can
verify Vi∗ using the stored Vi in step 3 of the password change scheme, when the smart card was lost
or steal, unauthorized users cannot change the password of the card without knowing the Ui ’s password
P Wi . Therefore, the proposed password change scheme provides secure password change.
We compared the proposed scheme with other related schemes [9, 10, 11, 12, 13] as well as Shieh-Wang’s
scheme [8]. Table 1 shows the comparison results of the security properties of the proposed scheme and various
other remote authentication schemes based on smart cards. As show in Table 1, in contrast to related schemes,
the proposed scheme is more secure and practical for smart card-based remote mutual authentication and key
agreement.
Table 1. Security properties of the proposed scheme with other related schemes.
Security properties
Replay attack
Guessing attack
Reﬂection attack
Parallel session attack
Privileged insider attack
Mutual authentication
Explicit mutual
authentication
Session key agreement
Perfect forward secrecy
Wrong password detection
Secure password change
Time synchronization
No veriﬁcation table

6.

Liaw et al.
[9]
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Insecure
Provide
No provide

Cheng et al.
[10]
Secure
Insecure
Secure
Insecure
Insecure
Provide
No provide

Wang et al.
[11]
Secure
Insecure
Insecure
Secure
Secure
Provide
No provide

Yang et al.
[12]
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Provide
No provide

Xu et al.
[13]
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Insecure
Provide
No provide

Shieh-Wang
[8]
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Insecure
Provide
No provide

Proposed
scheme
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Provide
Provide

Provide
Provide
Slow
No provide
No required
Yes

Provide
No provide
Fast
Provide
Required
No

Provide
No provide
Fast
Provide
Required
Yes

Provide
Provide
Slow
No provide
No required
Yes

Provide
No provide
Slow
No provide
Required
Yes

Provide
No provide
Slow
No provide
No required
Yes

Provide
Provide
Fast
Provide
No required
Yes

Performance comparisons

This section analyzes the eﬃciency of the proposed scheme. Table 2 provides computational costs of the proposed
scheme with various other related schemes [9, 10, 11, 12, 13] as well as Shieh-Wang’s scheme [8] in regards to
the registration, login, authentication and key agreement, and password change phases.
In the registration phase, the 3 time one-way function operation and 1 time exclusive-OR operation are
required to resist an insider attack. In the authentication and key agreement phase, the 4 times modular addition
operations and 6 times one-way function operations are required to provide session key agreement and perfect
forward secrecy. In the password change phase, the 4 time one-way function operations and 2 time exclusive-OR
operations are required to resist a stolen or lost smart card attack. The symmetric key computations and hash
functions are faster than the asymmetric key computations.
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Table 2. Computational costs of the proposed scheme with other related schemes.

Proposed
scheme
Shieh-Wang’s
scheme [8]
Liaw et al.’s
scheme [9]
Cheng et al.’s
scheme [10]
Wang et al.’s
scheme [11]
Yang et al.’s
scheme [12]
Xu et al.’s
scheme [13]

Registration phase

Login phase
3T (f ) 1T (⊕)

Authentication and key
agreement phase
4T (M A) 6T (f )

Password change
phase
4T (f ) 2T (⊕)

3T (f ) 1T (⊕)
1T (f ) 1T (⊕)

1T (f ) 1T (⊕)

8T (f ) 3T (⊕)

No support

1T (f ) 1T (⊕)

1T (f ) 1T (⊕)

4T (M E) 2T (f ) 6T (S) 2T (⊕)

2T (⊕)

2T (f ) 1T (⊕)

(n + 1)T (f ) 2T (⊕)

(n + 3)T (f ) 3T (⊕)

3T (f ) 5T (⊕)

3T (f ) 3T (⊕)

4T (f ) 5T (⊕)

4T (f ) 5T (⊕)

4T (f ) 4T (⊕)

5T (f ) 3T (⊕)

1T (f ) 1T (⊕) 1T (M E)

3T (M E) 4T (A)

2T (f ) 2T (⊕)

1T (M E) 2T (f ) 1T (⊕)

2T (M E) 3T (f ) 1T (⊕)

4T (M E) 6T (f )

No support

T (f ): computation cost of one-way function; T (⊕): computation cost of exclusive-OR operation or addition operation; T (S): computation cost of symmetric encryption; T (A): computation cost of asymmetric encryption; T (M A):
computation cost of modular addition; T (M E): computation cost of modular exponentiation.

On a typical workstation, the asymmetric key computations can be performed 2 times per second,
symmetric key computations can be performed 2,000 times per second and hash function can be performed
20,000 times per second. To provide the computational eﬃciency, we can change the the Diﬃe-Hellman key
exchange algorithm with nonce-based key exchange algorithm in the proposed scheme. In this case, the proposed
scheme cannot provide the perfect forward secrecy. But, the computation costs are very low because only a few
hashing function computations are needed like other related schemes.
In addition, other security requirements including session key agreement can still be satisﬁed unlike other
related schemes. Therefore, as in Tables 1 and 2, we can see that the proposed scheme not only is secure to
various cryptographic attacks, but also has the reasonable computational costs.

7.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrated that Shieh-Wang’s scheme does not provide perfect forward secrecy and is vulnerable
to a privileged insider’s attack, and then an improved scheme based on Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman problem
and one-way hash function was presented in order to resolve such problems. As a result, in contrast to ShiehWang’s scheme, the proposed scheme is able to provide greater security and practicality.
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